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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH.E STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
WA YNE NEIL HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellanto 
Case No. 18294 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Wayne Neil Harris, was charged with 
Production of a Controlled Substance (to wit: cultivation of 
marijuana), a third-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann., 
§ 58-37-S(l)(a)(i) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty after a bench trial 
on February 4 and 10, 1982 in the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for the County o·f Weber, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding. On March 3, 
1982, the appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate period not to exceed five years and fined 
$5,000. He appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 
against him. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 27, 1981, Dee Knight, who lived on land 
adjoining that of appellant's, contacted the mayor of Farr 
West City in Weber County to inform him that he had observed 
what he believed were marijuana plants g~owing on appellant's 
property (T. 24, 25).1 That same day, at one o'clock in the 
afternoon, Deputy Anderson of the Weber County Sheriffis 
Office (WCSO), accompanied by Trooper Jackson of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, arrived at Mr. Knight's residence and spoke 
with him about the matter (SH 22, T. 26). From a vantage 
point on his property, Mr. Knight pointed out to Deputy 
Anderson the suspected marijuana plants growing in a garden 
area some distance from appellant's house (T. 56, 57). 
Upon seeing the plants and believing them to be 
marijuana (T. 106), Deputy Anderson (who had previous 
experience in the identification and seizure of live marijuana 
plants (T. 64, 101)), along with Trooper Jackson, pulled his 
patrol car into the open entrance of appellant's driveway 
lReference to "T. 24," e.g., is to page 24 of the 
trial transcript~ reference to "SH 24," e.g., is to page 24 of 
the suppression hearing transcript. 
-2-
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(T. 55, 65) and walked down it in order to talk with 
appellant, who was out working in his yaid (T. 29, 62). 
During the conversation with appellant (the exact location of 
which is in dispute, but which took place on the driveway or a 
very short distance from it (SH 50, 51; T. 62; see Appellant's 
Brief, Appendix A), neputv Anderson· saw a number of marijuana 
plants in appellant's garden (T. 64). He then returned to his 
patrol car, radioed the WCSO and requested that Detective 
Shupe come to appellant's property (T. 64). Shortly 
thereafter, Detective Shupe (who also had experience in the 
identification of live marijuana plants {T. 138)) arrived, 
joining Deputy Anderson and Trooper Jackson at a point close 
to where the latter two officers had initially engaged 
appellant. Appellant was then arrested and the marijuana 
plants were siezed (T. 65, 66). Two days later on June 29, 
1981, Detective Shupe returned to appellant's residence with a 
search warrant and seized additional evidence (T. 108). 
At a suppression hearing prior to trial, Judge 
Cornaby denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized on June 27 and 29 (SH 61). At trial, he again_denied 
appellant's moion to suppress the evidence (T. 184, 185). 
Having waived a jury trial (T. 134), appellant was convicted 
by Judge Cornaby of cultivating marijuana (a violation of Utah 
Code Ann., § 58-37-8{l){a) (i) {1953), as amended), and 
-3-
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sentenced to the Utah State Prison (T. 198; Sentencing Hearing 
Transcript, p. 15). On March 3, 1982, the day of the 
sentencing hearing, appellant filed a petition for certificate 
of probable cause. The trial court set a hearing on this 
petition for March 9, 1982; however, at the appointed time 
neither the state nor the appellant showed up for the hearing 
( R. 53) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON 
JUNE 27, 1981 AND THAT SEIZED PURSUANT TO 
A WARRANT ON JUNE 29, 1981 WAS NOT 
INADMISSIBLE AS FRUIT OF AN UNLAWFUL 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
Appellant's argument concerning the admissibility of 
the evidence admitted at trial is twofold. First, he asserts 
that the evidence. seized without a warrant on June 27, 1981 
should not have been admitted because it was the fruit of an 
unlawful search and seizure. Second, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961), he argues that because the search for and 
seizure of evidence on June 29, 1981 was made pursuant to a 
warrant obtained on the basis of evidence and information 
garnered from the allegedly illegal search and seizure two 
days earlier, the evidence seized on the 29th was also 
inadmissible because it constituted "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." 
-4-
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Given the facts of this case, this Court is 
initially confronted with the questions .of whether the 
observations made by the police officers on the 27th were 
lawful and if they were, whether the lawful observation of the 
contraband was itself sufficient to justify the warrantless 
seizure. The answers to these questions will determine the 
legality of the officers' conduct on the 27th and thereby 
resolve the larger question as to the admissibility of the 
evidence seized both on the 27th and 29th (given that 
appellant's objection to the search and seizure on the 29th is 
based solely on the alleged illegality of the officers' 
conduct two days earlier2). 
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court said: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places. What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own 
home, or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
Id. at 351. Katz introduced the justified expectation of 
privacy· approach for determining whether a place is to be 
especially protected against unreasonable police intrusion. 
2Appellant suggests that there may have been a 
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-6 (1953), as amended, 
which concerns a receipt for property seizea pursuant to a 
search warrant; however, he then admits that a violation under 
that section would not render the evidence seized 
inadmissible. 
-5-
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Lower courts interpreting and applying Katz have often relied 
on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion therein,3 which 
elaborated on the majority opinion as follows: 
As the Court's opinion states, "the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places." Generally, as here, the answer 
to that question requires reference to a 
"place." My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for 
most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy, but objects, activities, or 
statements that he exposes to the "plain 
view" of outsiders are not "protected" 
because no intention to keep them to 
himself has been exhibited. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not 
be protected against being overheard, for 
the expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances would be unreasonable. 
In short, in the present case: 
[t]he concern •• ~ is with what police 
investigative practices, when directed at 
residential premises, do not intrude upon 
a protected privacy expectation as to -
those premises. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amenoment (1978), § 2.3, Residential Premises. 
3see, e.g., United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 
(9th Cir. 1976); Government of Vir in Islands v. Berne, 412 
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 6 Peop e v. Berut o, Ca • Rptr. 
217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969). 
-6-
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Appellant had no justified expectation of privacy 
where the marijuana plants he had growing in his garden were 
readily visible to persons on neighboring lands. See State v. 
Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d 48 (1981); State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 
621 P.2d 709 (1980); State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501 
P.2d 1084 (1972), citing People v. Bradley, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 
460 P.2d 129 (1969); and Dillon v. Superior Court, 102 Calo 
Rptr. 161, 497 P.2d 505 (1972). As noted in State v. Pontier, 
95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974), 
Planting marijuana plants in a back 
yard enclosed only by a picket fence and 
intermittent vegetation is not an action 
reasonably calculated to keep the plants 
from observation since it is certainly 
foreseeable that a reasonably curious 
neighbor, while working in his yard, might 
look over the picket fence into 
appellant's yard and see the plants, 
whether or not he knew what they were. 
518 P.2d at 973. Thus, based on this Court's reasoning in 
State v. Lee, supra, wherein it said: 
For an officer to look at what is in open 
view from a position lawfully accessible 
to the public cannot constitute an 
invasion of a reasonable expectancy of 
privacy. State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 
P.2d 709 (1980); United States v. Polk, 
433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970). 
Id. at 51, fn. 3. Deputy Anderson's observation of marijuana 
plants growing in appellant's garden from a point on 
neighboring land (upon which he had been invited) did not 
-~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
constitute a search and was clearly legal. See also: State 
v. Folkes, Utah, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977); Turner v. State, Tex. 
Crim., 499 S.W.2d 182 (1973); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 108 
Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973). 
Appellant's main argument is that the officers' 
uninvited entry on appellant's property without a search 
warrant and their confiscation of the marijuana plants after 
appellant's arrest (all on June 27) constituted an unlawful 
search and seizure. Having been told by a- neighbor that he 
had observed what he believed to be marijuana plants in 
appellant's garden and having themselves viewed what they 
believed to be marijuana plants,4 Officers Anderson and 
4Respondent recognizes that the record indicates 
that only Deputy Anderson actually knew what live marijuana 
plants looked like, but it was not unreasonable for Trooper 
Jackson to rely on Anderson's knowledge. Thus, all of 
Jackson's actions were also based on a reasonable belief that 
appellant was cultivating marijuana plants. 
Also, appellant suggests that Dee Knight's 
reliability as an informer was suspect because he had never 
seen a live marijuana plant prior to observing those in 
appellant's garden, and that this in some way further 
illegitimatized the officers' conduct. First, Mr. Knight 
testified that he had seen pictures of marijuana plants prior 
to his observations of appellant's plants (T. 25). Therefore, 
he had some idea of how marijuana plants looked. Second, as 
People v. Hubbard, Colo., 519 P.2d 951, 953 noted: 
When the source of the information is 
a citizen-informant who was an eyewitness 
to the crime and is identified, the 
information is presumed to be reliable, 
and the prosecution is not required to 
establish either the credibility of the 
informant or the reliability of his 
-8-
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Jackson had probable cause to believe that a crime was being 
committed and therefore had a legitimat~ purpose in walking 
down appellant's driveway, to which the gate was open, in 
order to further investigate the matter by talking to 
appellant who was out in the yard working.5 
Absent express orders from the person in 
possession against any possible trespass, 
there is no rule of private or public 
conduct which makes it illegal per se, or 
a condemned invasion of the person's right 
of privacy, for anyone openly and 
peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the 
steps and knock on the door of any man's 
information. Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307, 79 s.ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 
(1959) (additional cites omitted). 
This appears to be the view adhered to in Echevarrieta, supra. 
SAppellant makes light of Deputy Anderson's 
testimony at the Suppression Hearing indicating that he could 
not say with certainty that what he saw from Dee Knight's 
property were in fact marijuana plants. However, Anderson 
consistently maintained that he reasonably believed the plants 
he saw were marijuana (SH 26; T. 106). State v. Folkes, Utah, 
565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977), made clear that: 
When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the 
auty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violated; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
Deputy Anderson clearly had a reasonable susp1c1on of crime 
which justified his further investigation. 
-9-
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"castle" with the honest intent of asking 
questions of the occupant thereof--whether 
the questioner be a pollster, -a salesman, 
or an officer of the law. 
United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1972), 
quoting from Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 
1964). As noted by Professor LaFave in Search and Seizure, 
supra: 
Thus, courts have held "that police with 
legitimate business may enter the areas of 
the curtilage which are impli~dly open to 
use by the public" and that in so doing 
they "are free to keep their eyes open and 
use their other senses." [State v. Crea, 
305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975)]. 
This means, therefore, that if police 
utilize "normal means of access to and 
egress from the house" [Lorenzana v. 
Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973)] for some 
legitimate purpose, such as to make 
inquiries of the occupant [United States 
v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972); 
State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 
736 (1975)] ••• , it is not a Fourth 
Amendment search for the police to see or 
hear from that vantage point what is 
happening inside the dwelling (additional 
cites and footnotes omitted). 
Id. at Vol. I, p. 305. 
It follows, thereforP., that officers do not engage 
in a search if, for instance, they, from the street, observe 
plants in someone's yard or house and then enter on the 
property by a driveway or other normal access route to the 
house in order to determine if the plants are marijuana. 
-10-
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See, e.g., People v. Bradlev, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129 
(1969); People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 165, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 362 (1968); People v. King, 5 Cal. App. 3d 724, 85 
Cal. Rptr. 461 (1970). 
Citing Lorenzana, supra, this Court in Echevarrieta, 
supra, adopted these principles, holding that where an officer 
"was afforded an implicit invitation to enter upon the 
premises via the driveway and from his vantage point thereon, 
he observed the growing marijuana plant~," his observation did 
not amount to a search in the constitutional sense. 
Echevarrieta, supra, at 711. See also: State v. Lee, supra. 
Hence, in the present case, the officers' act of walking down 
appellant's driveway to further investigate a possible crime 
by talking to appellant who was at the time out in the yard in 
an area toward the end of the driveway, and Deputy Anderson's 
subsequent observation of marijuana plants plainly visible 
from a vantage point on appellant's driveway (or a point very 
close to it)--a place the officer had a legal right to 
occupy--did not constitute a search and were clearly legal. 
Even if the officers' only purpose for entering appellant's· 
property was to confirm their reasonable belief that what they 
had seen from the neighbor's land were marijuana plants, their 
conduct was clearly leqal. See People v. Superior Court, 
supra. 
The only question that remains concerns the 
legitimacy of the warrantless seizure of the plants visible 
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to the officers from vantage points on and off appellant's 
land. Appellant argues that because there were no exigent 
circumstances the officers acted illegally by seizing the 
marijuana plants, even though they were in plain view in 
appellant's garden, without first obtaining a warrant. 
However, under Utah law the warrantless seizure of the plants 
was legal as a justified confiscation of evidence in plain 
view incident _to appellant's arrest, notwithstanding the 
absence of exigent circumstances. 
Appellant was arrested without a warrant, which 
under the circumstances of this case was lawful and is not 
challenged in this appeal. See Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-
2(1) (1953), as amended. State v. Folkes, supra, held that 
where officers could lawfully arrest an individual without a 
warrant: 
they could take anything in the immediate 
area which was so involved in the criminal 
conduct that it would serve as evidence in 
proof of the crime (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 1127-1128. A further illustration of the proper 
operation of this rule in a situation where the police do not 
have a search warrant can be found in State v. Austin, Utah, 
584 P.2d 853 (1978), where the Court held that police officers 
who were authorized to be in a hotel room, although without a 
search warrant, properly seized evidence in "plain view" in 
the suspects' wastebasket. Finally, relying on Folkes, this 
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Court in Echevarrieta, supra, held that where an officer, 
incident to the defendant's arrest and without a warrant, had 
seized several marijuana plants in the ·aefendant 's yard 
(plants which were in the immediate area and plain view of the 
arresting officer), the seizure was lawful. The factual 
situation in this last case is very similar to that in the 
present case, and the differences are not such as to call for 
a result here different from the one the Echevarrieta Court 
reached. -
In short, under the doctrine of plain view as it is 
applied in Utah (which is consistent with the hoiaing of 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)), the officers' 
warrantless seizure of evidence incident to appellant's arrest 
was valid. It must be noted that the officers' seizure was 
particularly justified and reasonable since the contraband was 
in full view in an area where appellant had little, if any, 
reasonable expectation of privacy. As noted in People v. 
Arroyo, Super., 174 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1981), citing Lorenzana v. 
Superior Court, supra, there are certain situations: 
where a defendant ha[s] conducted his 
felonious activity in an area so open to 
public view that he could be deemed to 
have "implicitly invited" the police to 
observe and seize the contraband. 
Id. at 682, fn. 2. 
In conclusion, the officers' conduct on June 27 was 
both reasonable and entirely lawful. Hence, the evidence 
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seized on that day and the evidence seized pursuant to a 
warrant two days later was properly admitted at appellant's 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF THE CHEMICAL 
TESTS WHICH INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS MARIJUANA. 
Appellant initially argues that the hest evidence 
rule required that the color results of ·the Duquenois Levine 
test, performed by the state's criminalist technician to 
determine whether appellant's plants were marijuana, be 
introduced in court instead of the criminalist's testimony as 
to the test results. The best evidence rule, however, is not 
applicable in this situation. The rule is applicable only 
where the thing to be proved is the contents of a writing. 
State v. Reay, Utah, 368 P.2d 595, 597 (1962); State v. Baker, 
Wash., 413 P.2d 962 (1966). Hayes v. State, Okl. Cr., 397 
P.2d 524 (1964) provides a clear, general statement of the 
rule: 
For the purpose of proving the content of 
a writing, the original writing itself is 
regarded as the primary evidence, and 
secondary evidence is inadmissible unless 
failure to offer the original is 
satisfactorily explained. 
Id. at 527 (Emphasis in original). 
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The Hayes court went on to hold that in a prosecution for 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, the best evidence rule was therefore not applicable to 
the defendant's objection to admission of testimony concerning 
a blood-alcohol test on the ground that the sample of blood 
would be the best evidence. Accordingly, failure to introduce 
the color samples from the chemical test in appellant's case 
was not a violation of the best evidence rule. 
Appellant's second argument goes to the 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-2(24) (1953), as 
amended, which states the definition of "marihuana" as it was 
rewritten by the Utah Legislature in 1981. The deletions and 
additions made by the Legislature within the pertinent 
sentence of that section are as follows: 
The words "cannabis" or word "marihuana" 
means all parts of the ~l'aifts plant 
cannabis sativa L. and cannabis ineicia 
. . . 
Laws of Utah 1981, Chapter 75, Section 1. 
This amendment simply was an attempt to define 
marijuana in a scientifically and legally accurate manner by 
eliminating unnecessary references to "cannabis" and "cannabis 
indicia."6 In State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 
(1933), this Court fully discussed the history of marijuana 
6The Utah Code used the word "indicia"; however, 
the more popular spelling appears to be "indica." Respondent 
uses the latter spelling hereinafter. 
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and the meaning of that term for legal purposes. Its 
conclusion is reflected in the following language from that 
opinion: 
The plant or drug known as Cannabis 
Indica, or Marihuana, has as its parent 
the plant known as Cannabis Sativa. It is 
popularly known in India as Cannabis 
Indica; in America, as Cannabis Americana; 
in Mexico, as Cannabis Mexicana, or 
Marihuana. It is all the same drug, and 
is known in different countries by 
different names. It is scientifically 
known as Cannabis Sativa, and is popularly 
called Cannabis Americana, Cannabis 
Indica, or Cannabis Mexicana, in 
accordance with the geographical origin of 
the particular plant. 
Id. at 958-959. Citing Navaro, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 
Edition, 1979, defines marijuana as: 
An annual herb, cannabis sativa, having 
angular rough stem and deeply lobed 
leaves. • • • A drug prepared from 
"cannabis sativa," designated in technical 
dictionaries as "cannabis" and commonly 
known as marijuana, marihuana, marajuana, 
maraguana, or marihuana [sic]. 
In State v. Romero, 74 N.M. 642, 397 P.2d 26, 29 
(1964), the New Mexico Supreme court concluded that: 
marijuana is identical with cannabis, 
cannabis sativa L., and cannabis indica [ 
in that] [m] arijuana and cannabis indica 
are merely geographically oriented names 
of cannabis, whereas cannabis sativa L. is 
the botanical name of cannabis. 
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions. See, 
e.g., Martinez v. People, 160 Colo. 333, 417 P.2d 485 (1966); 
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State v. Curry, 97 Ariz. 191, 398 P.2d 899 (1965); People v. 
Savage, 64 Cal. App. 2d 314, 148 P.2d 654 (1944). 
Appellant cites only one case, United States v. 
Lewallen, 385 F.Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wisc. 1974), in support of 
his assert ion that under Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8 ( 1) (a) ( i) 
(1953), as amended, the State had to prove that the evidence 
was in fact cannabis sativa L. and not cannabis indica. The 
holding of that case--which said that because 21 u.s.c.A. 
§ 802 (15) referred only to cannabis sativa L. in defining 
marijuana, the government must show that the evidence is 
cannabis sativa L. and not cannabis indica or some other 
species in order to prove a violation of the law--has been 
rejected by every federal circuit court of appeals that has 
considered the issue. See United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 
201 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (see also fn. 12 therein citing other 
federal circuit decisions and several state court decisions); 
United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Lupo, 652 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Kelly, 527 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976). The Tenth 
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579 
(10th Cir. 1975) is representative of the position taken by 
those courts: 
The Walton opinion is most persuasive to 
us, reasoning that Congress intended to 
outlaw all species of marihuana since all 
types possess the toxic agent tetrahydro-
cannabinol. · 
Id. at 58 2, fn. 4. 
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The Utah Leg is la ture' s "cleaning up" of the 
statutory language defining marijuana do~s not reasonably 
irrlicate that it contemplated immunity from prosecution for 
those producing or possessing what is popularly called 
cannabis indica. The Legislature, like Congress, by using the 
term "cannabis sativa" to define marijuana intended to outlaw 
all species of marijuana, since all types possess 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). This is evident by the listing of 
THC in the schedules of controlled substances in Utah Code 
Ann., § 58-37-4 (1953), as amendedo See§ 58-37-4(2)(a) 
(iii)(T). 
In the construction of a statute, the Court must be 
controlled by the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain 
a certain end. State v. Navaro, supra. In short, the 
fundamental question which transcends all others is what was 
the intent of the Legislature. Johnson v. Tax Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966)0 Insuring proper effect to 
legislative intent and purpose is a primary consideration. 
Parson Asphalt Production, Inc. Vo Utah State Tax Commission, 
Utah, 617 P.2d 397 (1980): Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980). A statute should not be construed 
or applied so as to result in incongruous results which were 
never intended. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 
(1964). Accordingly, the Legislature's recent amendment of 
the definition of marijuana is most reasonably construed as an 
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effort to clarify the definition of that term {i.e., by making 
the definition scientifically and legal~y correct), and as 
intending to include all species of marijuana within the scope 
of§ 58-37-8{l){a){i). In short, given the widely accepted 
legal standard that cannabis sativa L. refers to all species 
of cannabis and that cannabis sativa L. and cannabis indica 
are indistinguishable, the Legislature did not intend to 
immunize the production of cannabis indica from prosecution. 
Therefore, in appellant's case, the State was not required to 
show that the evidence was not cannabis indica; it was 
required only to show that it was marijuana, the specific 
species being irrelevant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE 
STATE PRISON OR IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT 
A CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by 
verdict or by plea, the matter of the 
sentence to be imposed rests entirely 
within the discretion of the court, within 
the limits prescribed by law. 
State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 (1978). see also: 
State v. Carson, Utah, 597 P.2d 862 (1979). Appellant does 
not show nor does the record indicate anything which amounts 
to or even suggests an abuse of discretion in this respect. 
The trial judge fully considered all the factors relevant to 
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appellant's sentencing before he pronounced the sentence (see 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript, po. 14-lS)o 
With respect to the denial of appellant's petition 
for a certificate of probable cause, as noted in the Statement 
of Facts, appellant failed to appear at a hearing set by the 
trial court for consideration of the petition. Having offered 
no explanation for not taking the opportunity to present to 
the trial court reasons why a certificate of probable cause 
should be granted, appellant has no room- to complain of its 
denial on appeal to this Court. 
POINT IV 
UTAH ' S fv'..A RI JU ANA LAWS ARE NOT UN CONS TI -
TUTIONAL ON THE GROUND THAT THEY DENY 
APPELLANT HIS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENTo 
Appellant argues that his First Amendment right to 
"freedom of religion" is violated by this state's laws 
prohibiting the production and use of marijuana. He claims 
that based on the "Bible," the "Book of Mormon," and the 
"Doctrine and Covenants," his production and use of marijuana ! 
is justified as a religious practice and is constitutionally 
protected. This position has been soundly rejected in 
numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Brashear, 92 N.M. 
622, 593 P.2d 63 (1979); Town v. State ex rel. Reno, Fla., 377 
So.2d 648 (1979); State v. Soto, Or. Ct. App., 537 P.2d 142 
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{1975): United States v. ·spears, 443 F.2d 895 {5th Cir. 1971). 
Cf. Whitehorn v. State, Okl. Cr., 561 P.2d 539 (1977): State 
v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973): People 
v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). 
The following from Lewellyn v. State, Okl. Cr., 592 
P.2d 538 (1979), wherein the court rejected the claim that 
Oklahoma's marijuana laws were unconstitutional because they 
do not provide for the use of the drug as a religious 
sacrament, is dispositive of appellant's argument: 
Religious liberty is not an unlimited 
freedom, and while laws cannot interfere 
with mere religious belief and opinions, 
they may inhibit certain acts or 
practices. Perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment does not include the 
right to introduce and carry out every 
scheme or purpose which persons see fit. 
The religious liberty intended by the 
framers of the Constitution is not a 
license unrestrained by law. One cannot 
stretch his liberty so as to interfere 
with that of his neighbor or violate 
police regulations or the penal laws of 
the land, enacted for the good order and 
general welfare of all the people 
{footnote omitted). -
Id. at 540. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAS REPRESENTED BY EFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
Throughout his pro se brief, appellant makes 
general allegations that his counsel ineffectively represented 
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him at trial. However, he points to no specific incident 
which adequately supports that claim. The mere assertion of 
the charge aoes not prove the fact. State v. Forsyth, Utah, 
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977). The appellant bears the burden of H 
establishing ineffectiveness, and the proof must be demon-
strable, not speculative. State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918 
(1979). 
An accused is entitled to: 
[T]he assistance of a competent member of 
the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
defendant and present such defenses as 
are available to him under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the 
profession. 
Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 18, 499 P.2d 241, 243 (1969). 
This standard has recently been affirmed in State v. Malmrose, 
Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982). Appellant makes no demonstrable 
showing that the above standard was not satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has addressed those issues raised in 
appellant's pro~ brief and the brief submitted in his behalf 
by H. Don Sharp, Esq., which it believes merit a response. 
For the reasons discussed above, respondent respectfully 
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submits that the trial court's judgment and sentence should be 
affirmed. 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November, 
~ftj~~0WlM 
EARL F. DORIUS tV I 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy 
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Wayne N. Harris, 
P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah, 84020, and to H. Don Sharp, 
Attorney for Appellant, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah, 84401, this 8th day of November, 1982. 
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